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Uncertain, confused, divided, West German political leaders will not, in my opinion, presently contribute as they should constructive ideas to any re-examination of our NATO policies. The more enterprising regret having to depend on the Chancellor for guidance, but, in the last analysis, dare not rely on their individual judgments. In addition, there is no cohesive party line to which they can subscribe except faith that the Old Man knows best. Their Moses is dear, authoritative Adenauer. He has led them almost to the end of the wilderness, and, to shift the metaphor, though some would like few have the courage to suggest dropping the pilot.

The result is a growing tendency merely to criticize what the U.S. does or leaves undone. This sterility is appalling but real. Occasionally, Gerstenmaier, Kiesinger or others will conceive nebulous ideas, but their logic is usually vitiated by the desire to preserve American troops in Berlin and the Federal Republic, or even vaguely in France, and to have the U.S. guarantee, in case such ideas do not succeed, the use of nuclear

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weapons in a general war against the Soviet Union. As to reliance on the British and the French, from a military power standpoint, such sentiment (except that the Germans are solicitous not to offend their feelings) simply does not exist.

Simultaneously, they strongly favor Western unity, and are insistent upon full disclosure of American views in the NATO forum. They are, oddly enough, at the same time, very loyal and yet the most suspicious of allies.

The Chancellor is one of the most remarkable modern statesmen. However, one must subject, in our common interests, his personality to critical examination. His charm is overwhelming, his courtesy disarming. As a politician, he is cunning; as a leader he is superb. But he lacks fertile imagination, which to date probably has been a blessing. A man of fixed principles, he is not agile under international conditions demanding maneuvers. His judgment of men and events is often determined more by gossip than by analysis. He is a sucker for a glib story. Yet, ~~as a statesman~~ ^{in his own right}, his strength, derived from an undeviating conviction that Good will finally prevail, is formidable and comforting.

If the above reflections are generally correct, we must be prepared to form policies on our own, and drag, if required, the Federal Republic in our wake. We must not, since we have to live with it, underestimate the suspiciousness of the Chancellor. He has seen and experienced much; ~~and although~~ ^{although} confident of his own judgment, does not trust that of others.

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unless constantly reassured as to its wisdom. He is resigned to an acceptance that, right or wrong, his country's destiny will be shaped by forces in Washington beyond his control except as he can preliminarily influence them. He hopes reviews of Washington policies can be undertaken in NAC, before irrevocably pronounced. In the course of such reviews, he relies on Blankenhorn to interpret German interests, unconsciously of the fact, and I do not criticize, that his emissary, as a young Turk, is not devoid of concern for his own diplomatic future. Blankenhorn is an artist in intrigue, and likes to give delicate and pleasing interpretations of what happens in NATO to the Chancellor, and has the wit to garb them in amusing style.

I feel that on fundamental issues we can trust the Chancellor to be in accord with us, but he must be carefully managed. Before the NATO meeting, he gave it to be believed that he wished the Soviet proposals on Berlin to be rejected in toto, without any reserve as to later negotiations. The reason for this was his suspicious fear that if he did not so posture himself we might be inclined to parley with the Soviets over Berlin. As soon as he was certain the Western Allies would be uncompromising on the maintenance of their rights in Berlin, his representatives in Paris, as you will recall, manifested great haste to leave the door open to discussion with the Soviets.

Adenauer's domestic situation, like that in England, and probably throughout the Continent, demands readiness on the part of the United States

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to join in conversations with the Soviets, even though from these may flow no tangible results. But in Adenauer's mind, one topic as a separate item for negotiation is taboo, namely Berlin. That is the touchstone of his estimate of American good faith. He thinks we should continue to reason that the Soviet proposals in this regard are unacceptable and, if necessary, will be countered by force. However, there would be no objection to considering the future of Berlin in the context of a discussion of the German problem as a whole.

Like all great men, Adenauer is essentially direct. Although, as witness Embtel 1461, he wanders all over the landscape, giving vent to doubts and fears of a fanciful character, he always falls back on what he is sure of, i.e., the necessity for the FedRep to follow, after much expostulation, the lead of the U.S. To expect innovations from him would be mistaken. His character is defensive and negative, perhaps because of increasing years, but perhaps more largely because such an attitude has hitherto served the interests of his country and his own regime.

With above as background, should like to volunteer comments on our possible courses of action under prevailing circumstances.

1. Timing of delivery Soviet Note of January 10 during Mikoyan's presents in U.S., and between his first and second rounds of official talks, may be intended provoke unilateral official U.S. reaction to peace treaty proposal, and to create public impression Soviet Govt and ourselves

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already engaged in dialogue. Therefore recommend should Mikoyan try to discuss latest Soviet proposals or ask our views, he be told we share sentiments generally expressed in many countries that proposals seem to contain nothing new, but reply will be forthcoming in due course after usual consultation with our Allies. Would also suggest that in statements to press at conclusion Mikoyan talks, U. S. Govt spokesman say Soviet note not discussed, and mention consultation between Western Allies.

2. The spirit of Soviet initiatives beginning with Khrushchey statement November 10 constitutes a twin offensive directed against the security of the West, by direct pressure in case of Berlin and by longer term pressure in case of German peace treaty.

3. Although primary emphasis in Soviet January 10 note is on German peace treaty, statements concerning Berlin indicate no retreat from earlier Soviet position, and in fact suggest Berlin issue is devised as major instrument of pressure to force European "settlement" on Soviet terms. Impressed willingness consider "appropriate" counter-proposals on Berlin is meaningless, because note specifies such willingness depends on counter-proposals being "directed toward liquidation of occupation regime in West Berlin", i. e. withdrawal of Allied troops.

4. Since such is clearly unacceptable, I recommend reply to Soviet note reiterate in strongest terms that we are not prepared to

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negotiate on or even discuss Berlin, and that we intend maintain city's freedom and our position there by whatever means may be necessary. I am disturbed by Spach implication that "West should be prepared negotiate on Berlin alone" (Paris BOLTO 1926 to Dept) and by what seems to be growing tendency to seek "alternative solution" for Berlin. I see no alternative at present to maintenance Western position Berlin on basis our rights to be there and our determination stay there. Any suggestion that we are now in mood to consider alternative to Soviets' free-city proposal, or otherwise negotiate regarding city's status could only be interpreted as meaning we were prepared to bargain away our rights; and such a public interpretation would play havoc with Allies' confidence in us.

5. Fact that six month time limit as regards Berlin is not mentioned in Soviet note may indicate they are prepared at least postpone decision if negotiations on Germany are under way or in prospect. Observations, however, with which Soviets have reiterated their position on Berlin does not afford much ground for optimism concerning their intentions. Continuance of exchanges of notes may only freeze position, so that graceful withdrawal by Soviets on Berlin issue is rendered more difficult.

Therefore it seems to me we should try to persuade Soviets toward face-saving recourse to negotiations on overall problems which would absorb and soften Berlin issue. Our possibility might be after making

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emphatically clear to Soviets our rights in Berlin are not negotiable, and pointing out that Berlin is essentially only part of the larger German problem, to propose, if FedRep and other NATO allies agree, conference on "Germany" (not excluding a peace treaty) to be held within next three months, say mid-April after NATO meeting, and in Geneva. We might further propose that if at this conference agreement is reached on the essential and inseparable aspects of the German problem which must be resolved before a peace treaty can be concluded ~~negotiated~~, it be followed immediately by a "peace conference" of the Governments of those states which were at war with Hitler Germany.

6. Seems to me that advantage of setting our own terms we would thereby seize initiative from Soviets. At very least this maneuver might cause delay in Soviets' Berlin plans and lessen possibility separate Soviet peace treaty with GDR (Moscow's tel 1409 to Dept).

BRUCE

AUTH: David Bruce

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